There is scholarly support for the use of apologies in the settlement of legal disputes and anecdotal evidence of their effectiveness in mediation and other dispute resolution processes. There is also a growing body of empirical psychological research regarding the use and effectiveness of apologies available to inform and guide the practice of lawyers, mediators and other professionals, and judicial officers when apologies arise in legal proceedings. This article critically reviews the research literature concerning the experience of apology recipients and offers a framework for understanding the circumstances in which an apology may contribute to the resolution of a legal dispute.
Keywords: apology, civil, criminal justice, empirical, law, lawyers, mediation, mediators, researchAdverse events trigger complex interpersonal interactions between people who cause injury and those they injure. People who have been injured, including victims of crime and civil wrongdoing, often have psychological needs for apologies from a person they hold responsible as a wrongdoer. 1. There is strong scholarly support for apologies in settlement of legal claims, 2. and in negotiation, 3. mediation 4. and restorative justice 5. processes. There is statistical evidence that apologies are a common term of settlement in some areas of conciliated complaints 6. and anecdotal evidence that apologies can play an important role in mediation. 7. More generally, there is scholarship and commentary that draws on apology theories and research to provide practical guidance on apologies and apologising which can similarly be applied to dispute and complaint resolution across a broad range of legal settings. 8. While some concern has been expressed about the use of apology in the context of legal proceedings, 9. there are suggestions that these concerns can be addressed through informed and ethical practice 10. and are outweighed 11. by the overall benefits of apologies.
These interactions can play out in the presence of third party observers and professionals working with victims and wrongdoers in a legal setting. Numerous scholars and practitioners have proposed mediation as an ideal forum for wrongdoers to offer apologies to injured parties. 12. Indeed, there are many features of the mediation process that make it conducive to apologising, including the opportunity it provides for direct party participation in the process and for confidential and meaningful interpersonal dialogue. 13. Parties have an opportunity to make decisions about the outcomes of the process, including formal and informal terms of agreement, on outcomes involving dialogue, understanding and apologies. The opportunity for parties to give and receive apologies in a legal setting is not confined to mediation. Apologies sometime feature in lawyer assisted negotiations. In civil proceedings, a lawyer may advise a client on settling a matter on terms that include an apology and assist a client to negotiate the terms of a formal apology. In a criminal justice setting, a lawyer may be called upon to advise a client on the significance of an apology from the perspective of the defendant, the victim and the court.
In each of these settings, a third party professional involved in the legal process may form a different view to the recipient about the sincerity and value of an apology offered by a wrongdoer. The third party professional may feel uncomfortable or dissatisfied when they observe an injured party accepting an apology they themselves consider incomplete or otherwise imperfect. Injured parties, however, may accept these imperfect apologies because they consider them good enough, as they satisfy their needs in the specific circumstances and therefore minimise or eliminate the unpleasant psycho-physiological stress they experience in response to the psychological, physiological and social threats posed by the adverse event.
For this reason, both the professional and their client will benefit from understanding the function of apologies following an adverse event and the complexity of apologies. This article furthers that understanding by presenting an overview of the research on the function of apologies and a framework for analysing the features of apologies. The article reviews the psychological research on the experience of apology recipients. It explains the breadth and complexity of apologetic gestures, why in some cases apologies need to be more elaborate than in other cases and why parties to disputes may sometimes accept what appear to be incomplete, insincere or otherwise poor apologies. The framework of analysis is presented in the context of a legal dispute, but the value of this analysis is not confined to this context. It has relevance to anyone who seeks to anticipate, on an empirical basis, how an injured party will respond to an apology in any particular situation.
A number of factors contribute to the difficulty of anticipating how a person will respond to an apology. One factor is the difficulty of defining what is meant by ‘apology’ in any particular setting. There is no singular definition of apology. Where authors do refer to a definition of apology, 14. they often refer to the work of sociologist Nicholas Tavuchis, who concludes that, at a minimum, an apology entails ‘acknowledgement of the legitimacy of the violated rule, admission of fault and responsibility for its violation and the expression of genuine regret and remorse for the harm done’. 15. According to Tavuchis, an apology has two fundamental requirements: the offender has to be sorry and has to say so. 16. While Tavuchis’ definition has much to offer as a sociological theory of apology based on scholarly reasoning, empirical research that takes into account the reported perceptions of lay people regarding what type of apology would satisfy their needs as an injured party in the psycho-social context within which the apology was offered can provide valuable insight into this complex act. 17.
Another difficulty arises because, as other scholars have noted, there is a tendency to depict an apology ‘as a strictly dichotomous phenomenon wherein a victim either (a) receives and apology or (b) does not’, 18. whereas in reality an apology is a complex act capable of multiple forms of meanings. 19. To overcome this difficulty, and based on an understanding of apology from a psychological perspective, we work with a meaning of apology that recognises that there are components of an apology, and that what constitutes an apology in a particular situation and context is highly variable. There is consensus that a full apology incorporates an expression of heartfelt regret and remorse for what has happened, sympathy for the victim and acknowledgement of the wrongdoer's transgression. For some, the apology must also offer some form of recompense and a commitment to change in the future.
Another factor that makes it difficult to anticipate how an apology will be received is that an acceptable apology is a unique and subjective experience for every injured party. Exactly which components need to be present for an apology to be beneficial in any particular circumstance will depend on many factors. In Part 2 of the article, we discuss briefly the nature of the psychological-physiological reaction experienced by people who have been injured by a wrongdoer. We then present the empirical research on the experience of victims of wrongdoing within a framework for analysing their response to apologies. In Part 3 we identify a number of insights that arise from this research. We conclude in Part 4 that the empirically-based framework for understanding the features of apologies developed in Part 2 can assist third parties in the legal system to advise and assist parties seeking to resolve a legal dispute.
When injured parties and wrongdoers become aware of an adverse event, they can choose to ignore it, but generally they engage in a remedial (or corrective) interchange 20. during which they try to repair their self- and social images 21. and the relationship between victim and wrongdoer and deal with the psychological and physiological consequences of the event. 22. Wrongdoers generally start the remedial process by accounting for events in a way that makes them acceptable to themselves, injured parties and observers, 23. such as by denying responsibility (asserting innocence), making excuses (minimising responsibility), justifying their behaviour or apologising.
People from most, if not all, cultures learn to use apologies as a mechanism to acknowledge their mistakes, 24. repair their and injured parties’ social reputations, 25. and re-establish the relationships between them 26. where required. They might apologise because they feel morally obliged to do so or feel contrite, but they often apologise automatically to be polite 27. and/or sympathetic 28. without necessarily admitting responsibility. Wrongdoers sometimes apologise when injured parties do not expect them to do so, 29. but injured parties generally want apologies after transgressions. 30. Injured parties often experience wrongdoers’ failure to apologise as a violation of the social norm that wrongdoers should apologise for their wrongs, 31. which makes them even angrier. 32. Injured parties may, however, sometimes find apologies less satisfying than they expected, 33. accept them conditionally, 34. or reject them explicitly. 35.
People, however, objectively appear to be more likely to accept apologies 36. which observers 37. find imperfect. 38. Injured parties may in fact covertly reject these imperfect apologies, but not do so explicitly because of social pressure to accept them. 39. They may also accept them instinctively and unconsciously without reflecting on their quality, 40. especially if they feel good about receiving an apology, as people tend to accept the sincerity of those who make them feel good even when situational cues indicate they should not. 41. Injured parties, however, also accept imperfect apologies in settings where judges, 42. jurors, 43. lawyers 44. and mediators, 45. work even though the social pressure to accept apologies in such settings should be low and the pressure to make analytical, conscious, critical and objective decisions high. We believe that injured parties’ psychological and physiological needs may in part 46. explain why they make these apparently irrational decisions.
Both injured parties and wrongdoers perceive adverse events 47. as potential physical, psychological and/or social threats and consequently experience a three stage stress reaction which Hans Selye 48. named the general adaptation syndrome. People experience a fight or flight response during the immediate alarm reaction stage which allows them to physically deal with the perceived stressors. Those who cannot remove the stressors adapt to reduce their impact, and those who fail to adjust effectively to the continuing stressors may eventually experience stage three, during which their bodies’ resistance to the stressors gradually decreases until they collapse.
Stage one commences when injured parties perceive events that instantaneously activate their autonomic nervous system, causing them to experience the signs and symptoms associated with sympathetic nervous system responsivity, such as increased cardiovascular (eg, blood pressure and heart rate) and skin conductance (perspiration) activity. The consequent autonomous activation of the hypothalamus, pituitary gland and adrenal cortex (HPA axis) causes the secretion of cortisol, increased metabolic activity and elevated levels of sugar and other nutrients in the blood. 49. Whilst both wrongdoers and injured people experience the same unpleasant physiological reaction, their psychological responses differ notably. 50.
Wrongdoers generally conceptualise events as justified, closed and isolated incidents without lasting negative consequences. 51. They typically experience emotions 52. such as fear that injured parties will retaliate aggressively, complain or litigate; and/or guilt or shame because they impaired their social persona, and engage in account-giving behaviour. 53.
Injured parties, instead, try to understand the causes of events, 54. what went wrong, the seriousness of the consequences and why the event happened. They continue looking for answers until they acquire sufficient information to achieve closure 55. and can attribute blame 56. for the event. 57. Injured people consider three dimensions of the situation, namely, locus of control (could the person control the event?), source (was there an external influence?) and stability over time (is this a characteristic of the person?), when they attribute blame. 58. Injured parties experiencing an adverse medical event will therefore usually attribute a higher degree of blame to what they perceive to be a careless (could control event), lax (internal source) practitioner who acted in a characteristic manner (stable), than to an inexperienced, (less control), over-worked (external source) practitioner who they believe made an uncharacteristic mistake (unstable). They do not generally blame people for adverse events caused solely by external factors, 59. but may hold them strictly or vicariously responsible even though their behaviour may not be a sine qua non for the event. 60. Injured parties distinguish between justified, accidental (negligent) and deliberate (intentional) behaviour, 61. and often, especially in ambiguous situations, 62. blame themselves at least partly for what happened. 63. The degree of blame they attribute influences the nature and intensity of the emotions they experience, 64. and notwithstanding who they blame, typically they feel disrespected 65. and unfairly treated, 66. and experience feeling of anxiety, 67. depression, 68. hostility, 69. and, in the case of self-blame, also feelings of guilt and shame. 70. These responses, particularly together with anger, 71. determine how, and to what degree, injured parties will respond after an adverse event. 72.
Some injured parties internalise the situation and try to flee 73. and if they blame themselves they may, in extreme cases, attempt to kill themselves. 74. They more commonly, however, try to flee the situation by consciously or unconsciously avoiding those they blame and sometimes withdrawing from other people if they experience shame and depression. They thereby deprive themselves of the important positive social interaction, relatedness and support all people need, 75. especially when experiencing a crisis. Other injured parties express their anger and contempt for wrongdoers by fighting them and taking revenge 76. by, for instance, making formal complaints or litigating. 77.
Injured parties whose psychological and social needs remain frustrated may experience a state of unforgiveness characterised by continuous negative emotions and hyperarousal. 78. Unforgiving people constantly feel angry, hostile and resentful of those they blame for the incident. 79. Some accept this state because they consider the wrongs in question unforgiveable, 80. others because it protects them from further abuse, 81. helps them maintain their self-respect 82. and gives them the energy to engage in constructive behaviour. 83. People maintain the unforgiveness state by constantly revisiting the incident in a way that perpetuates their negative cognitions and emotions. 84. Most people, however, try to reduce or eliminate the state of unforgiveness 85. because they experience it as unpleasant, 86. unhealthy 87. and not psychologically or physically good for them 88. and, intuitively, do not want to enter stage three (the collapse stage) of Seyle's model. People can reduce their unforgiveness in several ways, 89. including by forgiving 90. wrongdoers. 91. Apologies can assist in this process.
Researchers’ findings of positive correlations between apologies and people's physiological 92. and psychological 93. functioning support injured parties’ beliefs that apologies will assist them to forgive. 94. Researchers also found evidence of an association between apologies and forgiveness, 95. but an apology does not appear to be a prerequisite for forgiveness, 96. nor does it automatically lead to benevolent attributions 97. or forgiveness, 98. which raises the question what effective apologies look like.
Injured parties do not believe perfect apologies exist, but believe an apology must be good enough for the situation. 99. In situations where two strangers bump against each other, in a shop for example, a discrete, brief, automatic, formalistic gesture or utterance such as ‘sorry’ 100. will do. In this situation an apology serves to ease the social awkwardness that may linger after both parties realise that they do not face any psychological or physiological threat. Injured parties, however, indicate that severe transgressions such as marital infidelity require long, laborious and complex interpersonal dialogues to bring about forgiveness. 101.
People respond differently to apologies with different features. All apologies, whether as a discrete event or as a longer process, share three features, namely sincerity, content and focus. We discuss the available research relating to each of these features in this section.
Injured parties generally want sincere apologies 102. and use several indicators to determine this sincerity. Injured parties from all cultures take into account what apologies cost wrongdoers in terms of time, effort and so forth. 103. They expect the persons or entities they blame to provide the apology at a level of decorum appropriate to the situation 104. and prefer in-person apologies 105. because they find wrongdoers’ body language informative. 106. They do, however, accept written apologies 107. and those offered by third parties on behalf of wrongdoers 108. because they suggest wrongdoers seriously considered the situation. Injured parties also see written apologies as indicators of wrongdoers’ sincerity because they believe that documenting apologies involve taking legal risks. 109. Injured parties consider the timing of apologies important, 110. and initially researchers found early apologies to be more effective. 111. Recently researchers found that injured parties find delayed apologies acceptable 112. when they perceive them to be well-considered, 113. especially if wrongdoers have been punished or paid compensation. 114. Based on the current information, it appears that the right time for apologies depends on injured parties’ ripeness and readiness to receive them. 115. Researchers found that spontaneous apologies have a beneficial influence, 116. but Robbennolt found that people do not necessarily distinguish between spontaneous 117. and non-spontaneous apologies, and that the situation may be more complex than previously believed. 118. Injured parties may view spontaneous apologies as attempts to escape or reduce punishment and/or revenge 119. and experience more anger. In ambiguous situations where there is doubt about responsibility, injured parties might apportion the blame, but if apologies include admissions of responsibility in ambiguous situations, 120. thereby removing all doubt about responsibility, they may apportion all blame to the apologiser. Injured parties may find non-spontaneous apologies useful 121. because they can provide specific information, 122. reveal wrongdoers’ emotions 123. and provide public, or at least private, vindication, 124. as most, if not all, apologies involve an element of self-humiliation on the part of wrongdoers.
Researchers found that people consider the content of apologies more informative than their presentation. 125. Most researchers, at least by implication, accept that apologies consist of specific components. 126. They differ as to the specific number and names of the components. Following Slocum et al, 127. we will refer to them as Affirmation, Affect and Action.
Affirmation represents the cognitive aspects of apologies which researchers independently refer to as admission of responsibility, 128. blameworthiness 129. or fault. 130. Injured parties expect wrongdoers to specifically identify and explain 131. events with a high degree of specificity, particularly those shrouded in uncertainty, 132. and to accept responsibility for them and their consequences. 133. Affect denotes the emotional aspects of apologies which researchers refer to individually as expressions of remorse, 134. regret, 135. true sympathy 136. or concern, caring and empathy. 137. Injured parties look and listen for signs in wrongdoers’ body language and voices 138. that show they feel remorse for what happened. 139. The Action component reflects the behavioural aspect of apologies and injured people's expectation that there must be actual or meaningful offers of repair or compensation, 140. promises of future restraint and forbearance 141. or action preventing recurrences. 142.
Researchers found that each of these components has an autonomous effect and independently has a greater effect than the offering of no apology, but that the accumulation of components has an additive effect. 143. People therefore prefer 144. full (all three components) apologies to no apologies and partial (less than three components) apologies. 145.
Injured parties’ subjective perception of components influence their interpretation of apologies 146. and they may believe one component (affirmation, affect or action) implies the existence of affirmation and/or affect, 147. or they may perceive some patterns of components to be more effective than others. Whilst affirmation and/or affect do not independently or together imply action, action could imply their presence, or, if present, reinforce them. 148. Injured parties may come to these conclusions because they realise that some people, particularly males, find it difficult to communicate their cognitions and affect, 149. or because behaviour carries more weight than words. 150. They may also come to this conclusion if the action leads them to consider the wrongful behaviour as atypical and not reflective of wrongdoers’ true character and therefore unlikely to recur. 151. Action in the form of harm removal only, however, does not change injured parties’ negative feelings and evaluations of wrongdoers. 152. Injured parties appear to interpret affect as an indication that wrongdoers will resist repeating the wrongful behaviour, 153. but verbal expressions of remorse appear to be neither essential nor necessarily effective, because injured parties do not always accept them as indications of wrongdoers’ remorse. 154. People judge wrongdoers who admit responsibility (affirmation) without any of the other two components negatively, 155. possibly perceiving them to be callous and flawed. Injured parties also judge wrongdoers who admit responsibility when clearly at fault negatively if they see it as impression management. 156. Wrongdoers who admit responsibility in ambiguous situations remove doubt about their liability, 157. which could make injured parties angrier, unless the admission absolves them from blame.
Slocum and her colleagues 158. found that apologies can range from exclusively self to self-other focussed. People's inherent self-centredness 159. makes it inevitable that they will primarily focus on their own needs. 160. They might offer self-serving apologies 161. to avoid the risk of humiliation and/or greater punishment, should their apologies be rejected. 162. A wrongdoer charged with assault might say ‘I am sorry it happened’, or, when confronting the anger of the injured party, the person may say ‘I am sorry you feel angry’. Injured parties sometimes accept such self-focussed apologies, but ideally they want self-other focussed apologies, which indicate that wrongdoers recognise the physical, psychological and social impact the events had on them. 163. They therefore want self-other focussed statements, which indicate wrongdoers feel regret for the right reason and understand why they are hurting, 164. eg, in this case, ‘I am sorry I punched you and humiliated you in front of your friends’. Injured parties therefore want wrongdoers to apologise because they experience guilt and/or shame, not because they pity them, 165. want to appease them, 166. want to save face 167. or avoid lawsuits. 168.
We will now discuss five variables that may influence injured parties’ decisions whether apologies are good enough to meet their specific requirements in the particular situation. 169.
People's expectations of apologies and their propensity to accept them differ, 170. and several variables may explain this. Researchers found that though people from different cultures share many expectations regarding apologies, their distinct cultural socialisation patterns 171. and their manner of interpreting and managing conflict 172. lead to unique cultural expectations. 173. Injured parties from individualistic cultures such as the United States therefore tend to have higher expectations of apologies for infringements of their self-image, whilst those from collectivistic cultures (eg, Japan) have relatively higher expectations when wrongdoers violated social duties. 174. Injured parties’ cultural perceptions of themselves as independent, connected with specific others or connected with broader society influence how they evaluate apologies. Those who emphasise relationships require wrongdoers to show remorse for the pain they had caused them, whilst injured parties who feel more connected to the broader society want wrongdoers to show that they realise they violated a social norm. 175.
People's age influences their interpretation of apologies, 176. but it remains unclear whether it influences what they expect of apologies. Forgiveness researchers, 177. however, found older people more forgiving, which suggests that they may have less stringent requirements of apologies. 178.
The few research findings regarding education and forgiveness suggest that higher-educated people may be more willing to forgive, 179. and therefore may be more willing to accept apologies.
Many researchers examined gender differences in respect of apology, 180. but they mostly focus on how males and females differ as apologisers, and how the content, 181. frequency 182. and strategic use 183. of their apologies differ. The few researchers who examined whether the genders differ regarding their expectations of apologies did not find significant gender differences. 184. The genders’ different social orientations may lead them to interpret apologies differently. 185. Bennet 186. found that females, for example, reported that they judged apologies they received from men and women differently because they considered men's behaviour over a period of time more informative than their words.
Researchers investigating injured parties’ dispositions in the context of the attribution of responsibility 187. and forgiving 188. found that people considered to be well-functioning and agreeable tend to be more forgiving. These findings suggest that injured parties’ dispositions may influence their interpretation and acceptance of apologies, and apology researchers found empathic people 189. and those susceptible to social pressure 190. less critical of apologies they receive. In contrast, injured parties with defensive self-esteem 191. and with low need for cognition (ie, less motivated to engage in effortful thought) may, in contrast, be more critical of apologies. 192.
Injured parties may have higher expectations of apologies coming from those whose status and linguistic styles differ from their own, because people tend to make harsher judgments of out-group people, 193. but to date researchers have investigated the effect of status on the offering of apologies 194. rather than how status influences injured parties’ expectations of apologies.
The degree of responsibility injured parties attribute to wrongdoers influences the anger they experience, 195. and their anger influences their willingness to accept apologies 196. and grant forgiveness. 197. Injured parties experience less anger when they attribute negligence to a wrongdoer rather than recklessness or intentional wrongdoing, because they associate intentional behaviour with immoral motives. 198. Injured parties who question the character of wrongdoers expect apologies that counter these concerns, and apologies that fail in this regard may increase injured parties’ anger and escalate the conflict. 199.
Relationships between people can vary across many dimensions, 200. which will influence what injured parties expect of wrongdoers’ apologies. Researchers found that injured parties in horizontal established relationships make similar attributions of responsibility and forgiveness irrespective of whether they are co-workers, friends or romantic partners 201. and that the relationships’ qualities, such as levels of attachment and injured parties’ satisfaction with the relationship, influence their expectations of apologies. 202. The level of trust within relationships influences injured parties’ expectations of apologies 203. because, whilst all injured parties experience a betrayal of trust 204. and a consequent sense of injustice, these emotions intensify as the perceived level of trust increases. 205. Injured parties’ expectation of apologies therefore increases as the levels of trust in relationships rise, peaking in fiduciary relationships such as between business and intimate partners. 206.
Injured parties generally perceive wrongdoers' commissions (in contrast to omissions), 207. breaches of formal norms 208. and untrustworthiness (in contrast to incompetence) 209. negatively and this could influence what they expect of apologies. Injured parties, for instance, see wrongdoers’ integrity violations (eg, financial mismanagement) as prima facie evidence of their flawed characters and find their expressions of regret more reassuring than their acceptance of full responsibility. 210.
Events may not have tangible consequences (eg, physical or financial harm), but they always have intangible consequences, which may be as devastating for injured parties as tangible consequences. 211. Intangible consequences can range from psychological (eg, anger, embarrassment, shame, feelings of injustice and disrespect and impaired self-images) and psychopathological reactions (such as post-traumatic stress disorders) to physical pain and cognitive disabilities associated with physical injuries. 212. Injured parties may also experience lingering or permanent consequences that perpetuate the stress and may prevent their anger from dissipating. 213. Injured parties who focus on the discrete and tangible harm of events may have lesser expectations of apologies if they received the compensation or reparation they wanted. 214.
Injured parties’ perceptions of the severity of the consequences of events do, however, notably influence their expectations of apologies. 215. They do not expect elaborate apologies after what they perceive to be trivial events, 216. but their perceptions of what constitutes trivial events often differ from that of wrongdoers, 217. and their expectations of apologies increase as their perception of the severity of the consequences increases. 218.
The previous part reviewed the psycho-physiological reaction by injured parties to events they perceive to be wrongful and the potential role of apologies in promoting forgiveness. We suggest that an understanding of the psychological needs of an injured party and the complexity of apologies can assist a third party professional working with the parties to a legal dispute. The analysis of the research literature in Part 2 provides a number of valuable insights about recipients’ experiences of apologies. Firstly, the complexity of apologies is accounted for by perceptions of sincerity, content and focus of the apology and by variables which include the relationship between the parties, the nature of the wrongful behaviour, the nature and severity of the harmful consequences, the injured party's perceptions and attribution of responsibility and personal variables related to the wrongdoer and the recipient. It tells us that the perception of what kind of apology in any particular circumstance will meet a recipient's needs is based on their subjective and unique experience. Whether an apology is acceptable to the injured party is a very personal judgment. A third party, including a legal advisor or a mediator, is able to refer to the variables identified in the previous part to assist parties to an adverse event to strive for an apology that contributes to the resolution of a legal dispute between them, psychological closure and, possibly, forgiveness.
Second, not all components need to be present for an apology to be ‘good enough’ to have value to an injured party. Nor does an apology require specific words. A person might feel they have received an apology through words or gestures, even when the words ‘sorry’ and ‘apology’ are not used. This explains why a third party may find a recipient's response difficult to understand in the circumstances. It also explains why the third party need not assess or evaluate the value of an apology that has been offered from their perspective or from an objective point of view. The third party, however, may also need to work with the reality that a recipient is unable to explain their decision to accept or refuse an apology. The third party should accept the explanation the injured party gives, even though the apology appears to be incomplete or not ‘good enough’ in other ways to the observer.
Third, the research referred to in the previous part provides an empirical basis for concluding that there is no formula for ‘a perfect apology’. Whether a person considers an apology ‘good enough’ in the circumstances will depend on the sincerity, content and focus of the apology and multiple variables relating to the circumstances in which the apology takes place. Third parties working with an injured party can draw on this framework of analysis to assist an injured party and a wrongdoer to understand their psychological needs and how these needs might be addressed by an apology. In a legal setting, this explains why an apology that satisfies an injured party's need for affirmation, even in the absence of sincerity and a self-other focus, might be accepted. It can also explain why an apology that meets an injured party's need for affect through an expression of regret or remorse and a commitment to action in the form of changes in the future may be acceptable, even in the absence of acknowledgement of legal fault or wrongdoing by the wrongdoer.
Apologies are often sought by people who feel aggrieved. Apologetic gestures in the form of expressions of regret and remorse, acknowledgements of wrongdoing, offers to make amends and other forms of apology are known to be important to the resolution of legal disputes. It is important, therefore, for professionals assisting and advising parties to disputes to have a sound understanding of how people experience apologies and what constitutes an acceptable apology. How should a lawyer, mediator and other professionals, including judicial officers, react when they observe an injured party accepting an apology that they consider incomplete or in other ways imperfect from an objective viewpoint? What if they believe the injured party is accepting an apology guided automatically by the apology-forgiveness script, or because they experience social pressure or because of their internal need to feel good?
This article offers a framework for analysis of apologies based on empirical research and a series of qualitative empirical studies of the perceptions of lay people as to what type of apology would satisfy their needs. We have briefly discussed the nature of the psychological-physiological reaction experienced by a person who has been wronged and offer insights from psychological research that can inform and enhance resolution of disputes in a legal setting and beyond. We show that an injured party may be accepting an ‘imperfect’ apology because they consider it to be good enough. In other words, the apology satisfies their needs in the specific circumstances and therefore minimises or eliminates the unpleasant psycho-physiological stress they experience in response to the psychological, physiological and social threats posed by an adverse event.
1. In this article we refer to events that cause physical and psychological injury as an adverse event. We refer to the person who injures another person as the ‘wrongdoer’ (even though legal wrongdoing may be in issue) and to the other party to the apology interaction either as ‘the injured party’ or the ‘victim’, depending on the context.
2. Eg, JR Cohen, ‘Apology and Organisations: Exploring an Example from Medical Practice’ (2000) 27 Fordham Urb L J 1447; A Allan, ‘Apology in Civil Law: A Psycho-Legal Perspective’ (2007) 14 Psychiatry Psychol & L 5–16, 5.
3. Eg, J Brown, ‘The Role of Apology in Negotiation’ (2003–2004) 87 Maro L Rev 665. More generally in settlement of tort claims, see D Shuman, ‘The Role of Apology in Tort Law’ (2000) 83 Judicature 180; C Brown, ‘Apology Legislation: Oiling the Wheels of Tort’ (2009) 17 Tort L Rev 127.
4. M Bolstad, ‘Learning from Japan: The Case for Increased use of Apology in Mediation’ (2000) 48 Clev St L Rev 565; H Cohen, ‘Mediation in Divorce: Boon or Bane?’ (1984) 5 Women's Advoc 1; DL Pavlick, ‘Apology and Mediation: The Horse and Carriage of the Twenty-first Century’ (2003) 18 Ohio St J on Disp Resol 829, 853–55; E Latif, ‘Apologetic Justice: Evaluating Apologies Tailored Towards Legal Solutions’ (2001) 81 BU L Rev 289, 295–96; R Carroll, ‘Apologising “Safely” in Mediation’ (2005) Australian Disp Resol J 40; D Foong, ‘A Discussion of Apology and its Use in Alternative Dispute Resolution’ (2007) 18 Australasian Disp Resol J 73.
5. Eg, CJ Petrucci, ‘Apology in the Criminal Justice System: Evidence for Including Apology as an Additional Component in the Legal System’ (2002) 20 Behav Sci Law 337–62.
7. See, eg, DL Levi, ‘The Role of Apology in Mediation’ (1997) 72 NYU L Rev 1165 ; DL Levi, ‘Why Not Just Apologize? How to Say You're Sorry in ADR’ (2000) 18 Alt High Cost Litig 147; Pavlick (n 4).
8. See, eg, A Lazare, On Apology (OUP 2004), esp. ch 10; AFM Brenninkmeijer, ‘Apologies in Public Administration’ (National Ombudsman's Office, March 2010) The Hague; NSW Ombudsman, ‘Apologies: A Practical Guide’ (2nd edn, 2009) accessed 2 October 2015.
9. See, eg, L Taft, ‘Apology Subverted: The Commodification of Apology’ (2000) 109 Yale L J 1135.
10. L Taft, ‘When More than Apology Matters’ (2013) 13 Pepp Disp Resol L J 181.
11. See, eg, British Columbia Ministry of Attorney General, ‘Discussion Paper on Apology Legislation’ (Ministry of Attorney General 2006); British Columbia Office of the Ombudsman, ‘Special Report to the Legislative Assembly of British Columbia on the Power of an Apology: Removing the Legal Barriers’ (No 27, 2006).
12. See, eg, Levi, ‘The Role of Apology in Mediation’ (n 7); Pavlick (n 4); Latif (n 4), for a discussion of features of the mediation process that support apologies in mediation. See also SS Raines, ‘Can Online Mediation be Transformative? Tales from the Front’ (2005) 22 Conflict Resol Q 437; Foong (n 4).
13. Mediation provides an opportunity for parties to express their needs and how they believe those needs might be met. Mediators are trained to recognise when it is important to parties that their needs are met other than through legal outcomes and remedies. In doing so, mediators can empower parties by guiding them ‘to resolutions that go beyond “legal solutions” to solutions that reflect their deeper interests’. National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council, ‘Maintaining and Enhancing the Integrity of ADR Processes – From Principles to Practice Through People’ (2011) 1 accessed 2 October 2015.
14. See, eg, Pavlick (n 4) 834, 835.
15. N Tavuchis, Mea Culpa: A Sociology of Apology and Reconciliation (Stanford University Press 1991) 3.
16. Tavuchis (n 15) 36.
17. For a review of the definition of an apology and apology theories, see D Slocum, A Allan and MM Allan, ‘An Emerging Theory of Apology’ (2011) 62 Aust J Psychol 83.
18. R Fehr and MJ Gelfand, ‘When Apologies Work: How Matching Apology Components to Victims’ Self-construals Facilitates Forgiveness’ (2010) 113 Organ Behav Hum Dec 37.
19. N Smith, I Was Wrong: The Meanings of Apologies (CUP 2008) 12 .
20. HS Hodgins and E Liebeskind, ‘Apology versus Defence: Antecedents and Consequences’ (2003) 39 J Exp Soc Psychol 297. These processes, as the other decision-making processes we discuss in this section, are guided by people's schemata and scripts which are socio-cognitive mental frameworks that allow people to make decisions automatically, intuitively and unconsciously. See G Gigerenzer and PM Todd, ‘Fast and Frugal Heuristics: The Adaptive Toolbox’ in G Gigerenzer, PM Todd and AR Group (eds), Simple Heuristics that Make Us Smart (OUP, New York 1999) 3–34; SJ Reynolds, ‘A Neurocognitive Model of the Ethical Decision-making Process: Impliciations for Study and Practice’ (2006) 91 J Appl Psychol 737; J Rieskamp and U Hoffrage, ‘When Do People Use Simple Heuristics, and How Can We Tell?’ in Gigerenzer, Todd and Group (eds), Simple Heuristics 141–67; Tversky and Kahneman, ‘The Belief in the “Law of Numbers”’ (1971) 76 Psychol Bull 105; A Tversky and D Kahneman, ‘Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases’ (1974) 185 Sci 1124. Schemata refer to mental concepts people have of something, for instance, what they consider to be right or wrong, and scripts guide them what to do, and in what order, in a particular social context. Schemata therefore assist people to process incoming information reactively and make fast decisions, and scripts allow them to behave in a certain manner. Wrongdoers who realise they have transgressed will therefore have an overlearned and culturally ingrained script that guide them to behave in a certain way and to expect a certain behaviour in response. Injured parties similarly use scripts to guide them. People's scripts allow them to quickly and effectively make complex decisions, but they sometimes make wrong decisions or decisions they later regret making. People can, and do, make more conscious, considered and purposeful decisions if they know they will be held accountable or the decision could reflect negatively on them if they make a mistake. See PE Tedlock, L Skitka and R Boettger, ‘Social and Cognitive Strategies for Coping with Accountability: Conformity, Complexity, and Bolstering’ (1989) 57 J Pers Soc Psychol 632; AW Kruglanski, ‘The Psychology of Being “Right”: On the Problem of Accuracy in Social Perception and Cognition’ (1989) 106 Psychol Bull 395. It is, nevertheless, doubtful that people can on their own make totally rational decisions independent of any subjective biases.
21. Injured parties experience the event as a threat to their self-image, status and power, and wrongdoers see it as a threat to their self- and social images as moral and socially acceptable people. N Shnabel and A Nadler, ‘A Needs-based Model of Reconciliation: Satisfying the Differential Emotional Needs of Victim and Perpetrator as a Key to Promoting Reconciliation’ (2008) 94 J Pers Soc Psychol 116.
22. B Ho, ‘Apologies as Signals: With Evidence from a Trust Game’ (2012) 58 Manag Sci 141; T Holtgraves, ‘The Form and Function of Remedial Moves: Reported Use, Psychological Reality and Perceived Effectiveness’ (1989) 8 J Lang Soc Psychol 1; K Ohbuchi and K Sato, ‘Children's Reaction to Mitigating Accounts: Apologies, Excuses, and Intentionality of Harm’ (1994) 134 J Soc Psychol 5; S Takaku, ‘The Effects of Apology and Perspective Taking on Interpersonal Forgiveness: A Dissonance-Attribution Model of Interpersonal Forgiveness’ (2001) 141 J Soc Psychol 494.
23. MJ Cody and ML McLaughlin, ‘Interpersonal Accounting’ in H Giles and WP Robinson (eds), The Handbook of Language and Social Psychology (Wiley, London 1987) 227–55; E Goffman, Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face-to-Face Behaviour (Penguin Books, London 1967); E Goffman, Relations in Public: Microstudies of the Public Order (Basic Books, New York 1971); Holtgraves (n 22); ML McLaughlin, MJ Cody and NE Rosenstein, ‘Account Sequences in Conversations Between Strangers’ (1983) 50 Commun Monogr 102; K Ohbuchi, M Kameda and N Agarie, ‘Apology as Aggression Control: Its Role in Mediating Appraisal of and Response to Harm’ (1989) 56 J Pers Soc Psychol 219.
24. BW Darby and BR Schlenker, ‘Children's Reactions to Apologies’ (1982) 43 J Pers Soc Psychol 742.
25. Ohbuchi and Sato (n 22).
26. M Bennett and C Dewberry, ‘“I've Said I'm Sorry, Haven't I?” A Study of the Identity, Implications and Constraints that Apologies Create for their Recipients’ (1994) 13 Curr Psychol: Dev, Learn, Pers, Soc 10.
27. P Brown and S Levinson, Politeness: Some Universals in Language Usage (CUP, Cambridge 1987).
28. MC Blackman and EC Stubbs, ‘Apologies: Genuine Admissions of Blameworthiness or Scripted, Sympathetic Responses?’ (2001) 88 Psychol Rep 45.
29. RF Baumeister, AM Stillwell and SR Wotman, ‘Victim and Perpetrator Account of Interpersonal Conflict: Autobiographical Narratives About Anger’ (1990) 59 J Pers Soc Psychol 994; S Blum-Kulka and E Olshtain, ‘Requests and Apologies: A Cross-cultural Study of Speech Act Realization Patterns (CCSARP)’ (1984) 5 Appl Linguist 196; JS Zechmeister and C Romero, ‘Victim and Offender Accounts of Interpersonal Conflict: Autobiographical Accounts of Forgiveness and Unforgiveness’ (2002) 82 J Pers Soc Psychol 675. This may, however, be an artefact of how researchers formulate their questions, or a demonstration of how people follow the apology-forgiveness script in order to do what they perceive to be socially desirable. See A Jaworski, ‘Apologies and Non-apologies: Negotiation in Speech Act Realisation’ (1994) 14 Text 185. People's eagerness to apologise may also be higher in the case of lesser wrongs when they use formalistic expressions of apology such as excuse me, pardon and, most frequently, sorry. See Blum-Kulka and Olshtain; AJ Meier, ‘Apologies: What Do We Know? (1998) 8 Int J Appl Linguist 215; A Trosborg, ‘Apology Strategies in Natives/Non-natives’ (1987) 11 J Pragmat 147; Jaworski 185.
30. TH Gallagher and others, ‘Patients’ and Physicians’ Attitudes Regarding the Disclosure of Medical Errors’ (2003) 289 J Amer Med Assoc 1001; T Marshall and S Merry, Crime and Accountability: Victim-Offender Mediation in Practice (HMSO, London 1990); KM Mazor, SR Simon and JH Gurwitz, ‘Communicating with Patients About Medical Errors: A Review of Literature’ (2004) 164 Arch Intern Med 1690; H Strang and LW Sherman, ‘Repairing the Harm: Victims and Restorative Justice’ (2003) 15 Utah L Rev 15; AB Witman, DM Park and SB Hardin, ‘How Do Patients Want Physicians to Handle Mistakes? A Survey of Internal Medicine Patients in an Academic Setting’ (1996) 156 Arch Intern Med 2565.
31. RL Thomas and MG Millar, ‘The Impact of Failing to Give an Apology and the Need-for-Cognition on Anger’ (2008) 27 Curr Psychol 126.
32. Ohbuchi, Kameda and Agarie (n 23).
33. D De Cremer, ‘To Pay or to Apologize? On the Psychology of Dealing with Unfair Offers in a Dictator Game’ (2010) 31 J Econ Psychol 843.
34. Bennett and Dewberry (n 26).
35. Allan, McKillop and Carroll (n 6).
36. Bennett and Dewberry (n 26).
37. Such as judges, jurors, lawyers and mediators. See JJ Rachlinski, C Guthrie and AJ Wistrich, ‘Contrition in the Courtroom: Do Apologies Affect Adjudication?’ (2013) 98 Cornell L Rev 1189; JK Robbennolt, JM Darley and RJ MacCoun, ‘Symbolism and Incommensurability in Civil Sanctioning: Decision Makers as Goal Managers’ (2003) 68 Brook L Rev 1121; JK Robbennolt and LM Lawles, ‘Bankrupt Apologies’ (2013) 10 J Empirical Legal Stud 771; BH Bornstein, LM Rung and MK Miller, ‘The Effects of Defendant Remorse on Mock Juror Decision in a Malpractice Case’ (2002) 20 Behav Sci Law 393; JK Robbennolt, ‘Attorneys, Apologies, and Settlement Negotiation’ (2008) 13 Harv Negotiation L Rev 349; L Bradt, M Bouverne-De Bie and S De Visscher, ‘Victim-Offender Mediation and Social Work: Focus Groups with Mediators in Flanders’ (2014) 57 Int Soc Work 121; Levi, ‘The Role of Apology in Mediation’ (n 7).
38. Bennett and Dewberry (n 26); A Jehle and others, ‘How Voluntariness of Apologies Affects Actual and Hypothetical Victims’ Perceptions of the Offender’ (2012) 152 J Soc Psychol 727; Especially see the series of informative experiments done by Risen and Gilovich. These researchers, inter alia, found that injured party participants accepted apologies that observers considered to be coerced and judged worse than no apology. As observers, anecdotally, less frequently question injured parties’ decision to refuse apologies, we will focus on the acceptance of apologies, but some of the mechanisms we present also explain the rejection of apologies. JL Risen and T Gilovich, ‘Target and Observer Differences in the Acceptance of Questionable Apologies’ (2007) 92 J Pers Soc Psychol 418.
39. Bennett and Dewberry (n 26); JJ Choi and M Severson, ‘“What! What Kind of Apology is This?”: The Nature of Apology in Victim Offender Mediation’ (2009) 31 Child Youth Serv Rev 813.
40. Risen and Gilovich (n 38).
41. R Vonk, ‘Self-serving Interpretations of Flattery: Why Ingration Works’ (2002) 82 J Pers Soc Psychol 515.
42. Rachlinski, Guthrie and Wistrich (n 37); Robbennolt, Darley and MacCoun (n 37); Robbennolt and Lawles (n 37).
43. Bornstein, Rung and Miller (n 37).
44. Robbennolt, ‘Attorneys, Apologies, and Settlement Negotiation’ (n 37).
45. Bradt, Bouverne-De Bie and De Visscher (n 37).
46. We do not know of any empirical research regarding how wrongdoers and injured parties think about apology as a moral issue and therefore do not exclude the possibility that people may objectively accept imperfect apologies because of their moral or religious beliefs, but this does not negate our functional explanation. We note that most of Cooney and her colleagues’ participants did not see forgiveness as a moral issue: A Cooney and others, ‘The Forgiveness Process in Primary and Secondary Injured Parties of Violent and Sexual Offences’ (2011) 63 Aust J Psychol 107.
47. JC Anderson, W Linden and ME Habra, ‘Influences of Apologies and Trait Hostility on Recovery from Anger’ 29 (2006) J Behav Med 347.
48. H Selye, The Stress of Life (McGraw-Hill, New York 1978).
49. For a more comprehensive discussion, see A Allan and D McKillop, ‘The Health Implications of Apologising after an Adverse Incident’ (2010) 22 Int'L J Quality Health Care 126.
50. B Weiner, Judgments of Responsibility: A Foundation for a Theory of Social Conduct (Guilford Press, New York 1995).
51. Baumeister, Stillwell and Wotman (n 29); AM Stillwell and RF Baumeister, ‘The Construction of Victim and Perpetrator Memories: Accuracy and Distortion in Role-Based Accounts’ (1997) 23 Pers Soc Psychol Bull 1157; Zechmeister and Romero (n 29).
52. BM Riek, LM Root Luna and CA Schnabelrauch, ‘Wrongdoers’ Guilt and Shame: A Longitudinal Examination of Forgiveness Seeking’ (2014) 31 J Soc Pers Relat 751.
53. Allan, McKillop and Carroll (n 6); R Banerjee, M Bennett and N Luke, ‘Children's Reasoning About the Self‐Presentational Consequences of Apologies and Excuses Following Rule Violations’ (2010) 28 Brit J Dev Psychol 799; D Keltner, RC Young and BN Buswell, ‘Appeasement in Human Emotion, Social Practice, and Personality’ (1997) 23 Aggressive behav 359; BR Schlenker and MF Weigold, ‘Interpersonal Processes Involving Impression Regulation and Management’ (1992) 43 Annu Rev Psychol 133; B Weiner and others, ‘An Attributional Analysis of Excuse Giving: Studies of a Naive Theory of Emotion’ (1987) 52 J Pers Soc Psychol 316; B Weiner and others, ‘Public Confessions and Forgiveness’ (1991) 59 J Pers 218.
54. DL Shapiro, EH Buttner and B Barry, ‘Explanations: What Factors Enhance their Perceived Adequacy?’ (1994) 58 Organ Behav Hum Dec 346.Gallagher and others (n 30); C Vincent, M Young and A Phillips, ‘Why Do People Sue Doctors? A Study of Patients and Relatives Taking Legal Action’ (1994) 343 Lancet 1609; PTP Wong and B Weiner, ‘When People Ask “Why” Questions, and the Heuristics of Attributional Search’ (1981) 40 J Pers Soc Psychol 650.
55. Wong and Weiner (n 54).
56. B Weiner, An Attributional Theory of Motivation and Emotion (Springer-Verlag, New York 1986). They do not attribute legal or causal responsibility but make psychological attributions of responsibility in their effort to explain the causes of events. We will refer to this attribution of responsibility as blame to distinguish it from the other meanings the word responsibility can take. See, eg, HLA Hart and J Gardner, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law (OUP, Oxford 2008).
57. FD Fincham, ‘The Kiss of the Porcupines: From Attributing Responsibility to Forgiving’ (2000) 7 Pers Relat 1; F Heider, The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations (Wiley, New York 1958); EE Jones and KE Davis, ‘From Acts to Dispositions: The Attribution Process in Person Perception’ in L Berkowitz (ed), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (Academic Press, New York 1965) 219–66; HH Kelley, ‘Moral Evaluation’ (1971) 21 Am Psychol 293; HH Kelley, ‘The Process of Causal Attribution’ (1973) 28 Am Psychol 107; Weiner, An Attributional Theory (n 56); Weiner, Judgments of Responsibility (n 50).
58. See Weiner, An Attributional Theory (n 56).
59. DA Schroeder and DE Linder, ‘Effects of Actor's Causal Role, Outcome Severity and Knowledge of Prior Accidents upon Attributions of Responsibility’ (1976) 12 J Exp Soc Psychol 340.
60. An example of this would be parents holding their daughter's boyfriend responsible for her drowning whilst she was swimming without his knowledge because he had promised to take care of her when they left home.
61. TJ Ferguson and BG Rule, ‘Effects of Inferential Set, Outcome Severity, and Basis for Responsibility on Children's Evaluations of Aggressive Acts’ (1980) 16 Dev Psychol 141; Fincham (n 57); Heider (n 57); Schroeder and Linder (n 59).
62. Wong and Weiner (n 54).
63. I Frieze, S Hymer and MS Greenberg, ‘Describing the Crime Victim: Psychological Reactions to Victimization’ (1987) 18 Prof Psychol-Res Pr 299; R Janoff-Bulman, ‘Characterological Versus Behavioral Self-blame: Inquiries into Depression and Rape’ (1979) 37 J Pers Soc Psychol 1798; R Janoff-Bulman and CB Wortman, ‘Attributions of Blame and Coping in the “Real World”: Severe Accident Victims React to Their Lot’ (1977) 35 J Pers Soc Psychol 351.
64. Schroeder and Linder (n 59); Weiner and others, ‘An Attributional Analysis of Excuse Giving’ (n 53).
65. LM Cortina and others, ‘Incivility in the Workplace: Incidence and Impact’ (2001) 6 J Occup Health Psychol 64.
66. R Walster, E Berscheid and GW Walster, ‘New Directions in Equity Research’ (1973) 25 J Pers Soc Psychol 151.
67. JK Kiecolt-Glaser and others, ‘Emotions, Morbidity, and Morality: New Perspectives from Psychoneuroimmunology’ (2002) 53 Ann Rev Psychol 83.
68. Kiecolt-Glaser and others (n 67).
69. Kiecolt-Glaser and others (n 67).
70. JP Tangney and others, ‘Shamed Into Anger? The Relation of Shame and Guilt to Anger and Self-reported Aggression’ (1992) 62 J Pers Soc Psychol 669.
71. Walster, Berscheid and Walster (n 66); Weiner, An Attributional Theory (n 56); Kiecolt-Glaser and others (n 67).
72. Weiner, Judgments of Responsibility (n 50).
73. JM Gottman, ‘A Theory of Marital Dissolution and Stability’ (1993) 7 J Fam Psychol 57; JM Gottman, What Predicts Divorce? (Erlbaum, New Jersey 1994).
74. RF Baumeister, ‘Suicide as Escape from Self’ (1990) 97 Psychol Rev 90; PJ Dean and LM Range, ‘Testing the Escape Theory of Suicide in an Outpatient Clinical Population’ (1999) 23 Cog Therapy Res 561; ES Shneidman, The Suicidal Mind (OUP, New York 1996).
75. RF Baumeister and MR Leary, ‘The Need to Belong: Desire for Interpersonal Attachments as a Fundamental Human Motivation’ (1995) 117 Psychol Bull 497; RM Ryan and EL Deci, ‘Self-determination Theory and the Facilitation of Intrinsic Motivation, Social Development, and Well-being’ (2000) 55 Am Psychol 68.
76. ME McCullough, R Kurzban and BA Kurzban, ‘Cognitive Systems for Revenge and Forgiveness’ (2013) 36 Behav Brain Sci 1.
77. Gottman, ‘Theory of Marital Dissolution’ (n 73); Gottman, What Predicts Divorce? (n 73); ME McCullough and others, ‘Interpersonal Forgiveness in Close Relationships II: Theoretical Elaboration and Measurement’ (1998) 75 J Pers Soc Psychol 1586.
78. EL Worthington and NG Wade, ‘The Psychology of Unforgiveness and Forgiveness and Implications for Clinical Practice’ (1999) 18 J Soc Clin Psychol 385; EL Worthington and M Scherer, ‘Forgiveness is an Emotion-Focused Coping Strategy that Can Reduce Health Risks and Promote Health Resilience: Theory, Review, and Hypothesis’ (2004) 19 Psychol and Health 385. Unforgiving is an unfortunate term given that forgiving is not the only way of resolving this state, but we will use it because there is not currently a term that accurately captures the resentment, bitterness and hostility that people who believe they have been wronged feel.
79. Walster, Berscheid and Walster (n 66); Weiner, An Attributional Theory (n 56); EL Worthington, ‘The Pyramid Model of Forgiveness: Some Interdisciplinary Speculations about Unforgiveness and the Promotion of Forgiveness’ in EL Worthington (ed), Dimensions of Forgiveness: Psychological Research and Theological Perspectives (Templeton Foundation Press, Philadelphia 1998) 107–37.
80. GF Bachman and LK Guerrero, ‘Forgiveness, Apology and Communicative Responses to Hurtful Events’ (2006a) 19 Commun Rep 45; KM Mazor and others, ‘Health Plan Members’ Views on Forgiving Medical Errors’ (2005) 11 Am J Aged Care 49; DL Rapske and others, ‘Not Forgiven, Not Forgotten: An Investigation of Unforgiven Interpersonal Offenses’ (2010) 29 J Soc Clin Psychol 1100.
81. See, eg, J Stubbs, ‘Beyond Apology? Domestic Violence and Critical Questions for Restorative Justice’ (2007) 7 Crim and Crim Just 169; C Lavery and M Achilles, ‘Apologies: Balancing the Needs of Victims and Offenders’ (1999) 3 VOMA Connections 6; JK McNulty, ‘The Dark Side of Forgiveness: The Tendency to Forgive Predicts Continued Psychological and Physical Aggression in Marriage’ (2011) 37 Pers Soc Psychol Bull 770.
82. LB Luchies and others, ‘The Doormat Effect: When Forgiving Erodes Self-respect and Self-concept Clarity’ (2010) 98 J Pers Soc Psychol 734.
83. For instance, by advocating and bringing about reforms that may decrease the risk of a similar harmful event from occurring in future.
84. ME McCullough, G Bono and LM Root, ‘Rumination, Emotion, and Forgiveness: Three Longitudinal Studies’ (2007) 92 J Pers Soc Psychol 490; TJ Scheff, ‘The Shame-Rage Spiral: A Case Study of an Interminable Quarrel’ in HB Lewis (ed), The Role of Shame in Symptom Formation (Erlbaum, New Jersey 1987) 109–49; Cooney and others (n 46).
85. GJ Gold and J Davis, ‘Psychological Determinants of Forgiveness: An Evolutionary Perspective’ (2005) 29 Humboldt J Soc Relat 111.
86. NG Wade and EL Worthington, ‘Overcoming Interpersonal Offenses: Is Forgiveness the Only Way to Deal with Unforgiveness?’ (2003) 81 J Couns and Dev 343; CVO Witvliet, EL Worthington and NG Wade, ‘Victims’ Heart Rate and Facial EMG Responses to Receiving an Apology and Restitution’ (2002) 39 Psychophysiology Suppl S88; EL Worthington, ‘Unforgiveness, Forgiveness, and Reconciliation in Societies’ in RG Helmick and RL Petersen (eds), Forgiveness and Reconciliation: Religion, Public Policy, and Conflict Transformation (Templeton Foundation Press 2001) 161.
87. Kiecolt-Glaser and others (n 67).
88. Cooney and others (n 46); Kiecolt-Glaser and others (n 67); A Harris and CE Thoresen, ‘Forgiveness, Unforgiveness, Health, and Disease’ in EL Worthington (ed), Handbook of Forgiveness (Brunner-Routlege 2005) 321–33; RM Kaplan and DP Saccuzzo, Psychological Testing: Principles, Applications, and Issues (5th edn, Wadsworth 2001); J Pingleton, ‘The Role and Function of Forgiveness in the Psychotherapeutic Process’ (1989) 17 J Psychol and Theol 35; CE Thoresen, AHS Harris and F Luskin, ‘Forgiveness and Health’ in ME McCullough, KI Pargament and CE Thoresen (eds), Forgiveness: Theory, Research, and Practice (Guilford Press 2000) 254–80.
89. Other methods include taking revenge, denying the consequences, cognitively reframing the event, pursuing legal action or getting reasonable restitution in another way. See Wade and Worthington (n 86); Worthington, ‘Unforgiveness, Forgiveness, and Reconciliation’ (n 86).
90. We will use the word forgiveness in a generic sense of the word because many of the researchers whose research we refer to did not define the construct clearly, but the term can be used in several specific ways. Injured people often say that they must forgive themselves before they can forgive wrongdoers and describe it as moving away from feeling guilty to feeling empowered enough to let ‘go of their negative experiences for their own benefit’. See Cooney and others (n 46) at 112. This letting go can be called intra-forgiveness because injured parties choose not to, or cannot, communicate their internal forgiveness to wrongdoers because they are unidentified or absent. Jacoby (at 347) describes this internal forgiveness as a ‘state of mind – a condition that may be emotionally meaningful to the one who forgives but has no significance as a social bond’. Injured parties who feel they understand the situation and wrongdoers’ motives may experience neutral to positive feelings towards wrongdoers and can tell available wrongdoers they forgive them. This form of interpersonal forgiveness may be followed by reconciliation which constitutes the restoration of the mutual trust between the parties. See Fincham (n 57); McCullough, Kurzban and Kurzban (n 76); KA Lawler-Row and others, ‘The Varieties of Forgiveness Experience: Working Towards a Comprehensive Definition of Forgiveness’ (2007) 46 J Relig Health 233; JW Younger and others, ‘Dimensions of Forgiveness: The Views of Laypersons’ (2004) 21 J Soc Pers Relat 837; JS Zechmeister and others, ‘Don't Apologise Unless You Mean It: A Laboratory Investigation of Forgiveness and Retaliation’ (2004) 23 J Soc Clin Psychol 532; JH Hall and FD Fincham, ‘Self-forgiveness: The Stepchild of Forgiveness Research’ (2005) 24 J Soc Clin Psychol 621; S Jacoby, Wild Justice: The Evolution of Revenge (Harper and Row, New York 1983).
91. Wade and Worthington (n 86); Worthington, ‘Unforgiveness, Forgiveness, and Reconciliation’ (n 86).
92. Anderson, Linden and Habra (n 47).
93. Darby and Schlenker, ‘Children's Reactions to Apologies’ (n 24); BW Darby and BR Schlenker, ‘Children's Reaction to Transgression: Effects of the Actor's Apology, Reputation and Remorse’ (1989) 28 Brit J Soc Psychol 353; D De Cremer and BC Schouten, ‘When Apologies for Injustice Matter: The Role of Respect’ (2008) 13 Eur Psychol 239; CS Hyman and CB Schechter, ‘Mediating Medical Malpractice Lawsuits Against Hospitals: New York City's Pilot Project’ (2006) 25 Health Aff 1394; JK Robbennolt, ‘Apologies and Legal Settlement: An Empirical Examination’ (2003) 102 Mich L Rev 460; JK Robbennolt, ‘Apologies and Settlement Levers’ (2006) 3 J Empirical Legal Stud 333; JK Robbennolt, ‘The Effects of Negotiated and Delegated Apologies in Settlement Negotiation’ (2013) Law Hum Behav 128.
94. For a discussion, see MS Umbreit and others, Facing Violence: The Path of Restorative Justice and Dialogue (Criminal Justice Press 2003); Slocum, Allan and Allan (n 17); Y Takahashi, ‘Toward a Balancing Approach: The Use of Apology in Japanese Society’ (2005) 12 Int Rev Victimol 23.
95. A Allan and others, ‘Exploration of the Association Between Apology and Forgiveness Amongst Victims of Human Rights Violations’ (2006) 24 Behav Sci Law 87; JR Davis and GJ Gold, ‘An Examination of Emotional Empathy, Attributions of Stability, and the Link Between Perceived Remorse and Forgiveness’ (2011) 50 Pers Individ Dif 392; JJ Exline, L Deshea and VT Holeman, ‘Is Apology Worth the Risk? Predictors, Outcomes, and Ways to Avoid Regret’ (2007) 26 J Soc Clin Psychol 479; Hodgins and Liebeskind (n 20); ME McCullough, EL Worthington and KC Rachal, ‘Interpersonal Forgiving in Close Relationships’ (1997) 73 J Pers Soc Psychol 321; Zechmeister and others (n 90).
96. Allan and others, ‘Exploration’ (n 95); JE Kanz, ‘How do People Conceptualize and Use Forgiveness? The Forgiveness Attitudes Questionnaire’ (2000) 44 Couns Values 174; Zechmeister and Romero (n 29). This may not be true for all cultures because Mullet and Azar report that the presence of apologising behaviour was a necessary condition for the resentment to weaken in their Lebanese Muslims sample: E Mullet and F Azar, ‘Apologies, Repentance, and Forgiveness: A Muslim-Christian Comparison’ (2009) 19 Int J Psychol Relig 275.
98. Allan and others, ‘Exploration’ (n 95); MK Dhami, ‘Offer and Acceptance of Apology in Victim-Offender Mediation’ (2012) 20 Critical Crim 45; Fehr and Gelfand (n 18); Zechmeister and others (n 90).
99. Slocum, Allan and Allan (n 17).
100. Blackman and Stubbs (n 28).
101. Bachman and Guerrero, ‘Forgiveness, Apology and Communicative Responses’ (n 80); RAM Iedema and others, ‘Patients’ and Family Members’ Views on How Clinicians Enact and How They Should Enact Incident Disclosure: The “100 Patient Stories” Qualitative Study’ (2011) 343 Brit Med J; Slocum, Allan and Allan (n 17).
102. See, eg, Allan and others, ‘Exploration’ (n 95); Allan and others, ‘Apology in Restorative and Juvenile Justice’ (2013) 20 Psychiatry Psychol & L 176; Bachman and Guerrero, ‘Forgiveness, Apology and Communicative Responses’(n 80); Choi and Severson (n 39); Davis and Gold (n 95); De Cremer and Schouten (n 93); KM Mazor and others, ‘Health Plan Members’ Views about Disclosure of Medical Errors’ (2004) 140 Ann Intern Med 409; BA Tabak and others, ‘Conciliatory Gestures Facilitate Forgiveness and Feelings of Friendship by Making Wrongdoers Appear More Agreeable’ (2012) 80 J Pers 503; EC Tomlinson, BR Dineen and RJ Lewicki, ‘The Road to Reconciliation: Antecedents of Victim Willingness to Reconcile Following a Broken Promise’ (2004) 30 J Manag 165.
103. Y Ohtsubo and others, ‘Are Costly Apologies Universally Perceived as Being Sincere?’ (2012) 10 J Evol Psychol 187.
104. Iedema and others (n 101).
105. Allan, McKillop and Carroll (n 6); Iedema and others (n 101); Robbennolt, ‘Effects of Negotiated and Delegated Apologies’ (n 93).
106. Shapiro, Buttner and Barry (n 54); Slocum, Allan and Allan (n 17).
107. Allan, McKillop and Carroll (n 6).
108. Robbennolt, ‘Effects of Negotiated and Delegated Apologies’ (n 93); Slocum, Allan and Allan (n 17).
109. Allan, McKillop and Carroll (n 6).
110. See, eg, Allan, McKillop and Carroll (n 6); JZ Rubin, DG Pruitt and SH Kim, Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate and Settlement (2nd edn, McGraw-Hill, New York 1994); SB Sitkin and RJ Bies, ‘Social Accounts in Conflict Situations: Using Explanations to Manage Conflict’ (1993) 46 Hum Relat 349.
111. JF Kremer and L Stephens, ‘Attributions and Arousal as Mediators of Mitigation's Effect on Retaliation’ (1983) 45 J Pers Soc Psychol 335; Sitkin and RJ Bies (n 110); Weiner and others, ‘Public Confessions and Forgiveness’ (n 53); D Zillman and JR Cantor, ‘The Timing of Information about Mitigating Circumstances on Emotional Responses to Provocation and Retaliatory Behavior’ (1976) 12 J Exp Soc Psychol 38.
112. CM Frantz and C Bennigson, ‘Better Late than Early: The Influence of Timing on Apology Effectiveness’ (2005) 41 J Exp Soc Psychol 201; Slocum, Allan and Allan (n 17).
113. Slocum, Allan and Allan (n 17).
114. Allan and others, ‘Apology in Restorative and Juvenile Justice’ (n 102).
115. Frantz and Bennigson (n 112); Iedema and others (n 101).
116. See, eg, Risen and Gilovich (n 38); Weiner and others, ‘Public Confessions and Forgiveness’ (n 53).
117. Robbennolt, ‘Effects of Negotiated and Delegated Apologies’ (n 93).
118. Bornstein, Rung and Miller (n 37).
119. Darby and Schlenker, ‘Children's Reaction to Transgression’ (n 93); BR Schlenker and BW Darby, ‘The Use of Apologies in Social Predicaments’ (1981) 44 Soc Psychol Q 271.
120. SD Boon and LM Sulsky, ‘Attributions of Blame and Forgiveness in Romantic Relationships: A Policy-Capturing Study’ (1997) 12 J Soc Behav Pers 19; Zechmeister and others (n 90).
121. See, eg, Jehle and others (n 38); Risen and Gilovich (n 38); Weiner and others, ‘Public Confessions and Forgiveness’ (n 53); Robbennolt, ‘Effects of Negotiated and Delegated Apologies’ (n 93).
122. Shapiro, Buttner and Barry (n 54).
123. Robbennolt, ‘Effects of Negotiated and Delegated Apologies’ (n 93).
124. Allan, McKillop and Carroll (n 6).
125. Shapiro, Buttner and Barry (n 54).
126. See, eg, Anderson, Linden and Habra (n 47); S Blum-Kulka, J House and G Kasper (eds), Cross-cultural Pragmatics: Requests and Apologies (Ablex, New Jersey 1989); Darby and Schlenker, ‘Children's Reactions to Apologies’ (n 24); Fehr and Gelfand (n 18); J Kirchhoff, U Wagner and M Strack, ‘Apologies: Words of Magic? The Role of Verbal Components, Anger Reduction, and Offence Severity’ (2012) 18 Peace Confl: J Peace Psychol 109; KM Mazor and others, ‘More than Words: Patients’ Views on Apology and Disclosure when Things Go Wrong in Cancer Care’ (2013) 90 Patient Educ Couns 341; SJ Scher and JM Darley, ‘How Effective Are the Things People Say to Apologize? Effects of the Realization of the Apology Speech Act’ (1997) 26 J Psycholinguist Res 127; M Schmitt and others, ‘Effects of Objective and Subjective Account Components on Forgiving’ (2004) 144 J Soc Psychol 465; Slocum, Allan and Allan (n 17).
127. Slocum, Allan and Allan (n 17).
128. Anderson, Linden and Habra (n 47); Mazor and others, ‘More than Words’ (n 126); Weiner and others, ‘Public Confessions and Forgiveness’ (n 53).
129. Schlenker and Darby (n 119).
130. Kirchhoff, Wagner and M Strack (n 126).
131. Anderson, Linden and Habra (n 47); C Behrenbruch and G Davies, ‘The Power of Explanation in Healthcare Mediation’ (2013) 24 Alt Disp Resol J 54; RJ Bies, DL Shapiro and LL Cummings, ‘Causal Accounts and Managing Organizational Conflict: Is it Enough to Say It's Not My Fault?’ (1988) 15 Commun Res 381; Mazor and others, ‘More than Words’ (n 126); Shapiro, Buttner and Barry (n 54); Slocum, Allan and Allan (n 17).
132. J Brockner and others, ‘When it Is Especially Important to Explain Why: Factors Affecting the Relationship Between Managers’ Explanations of a Layoff and Survivors’ Reactions to the Layoff’ (1990) 26 J Exp Soc Psychol 389; Shapiro, Buttner and Barry (n 54).
133. Anderson, Linden and Habra (n 47); M Bennett and D Earwaker, ‘Victims’ Responses to Apologies: The Effects of Offender Responsibility and Offense Severity’ (1994) 134 J Soc Psychol 457; Hodgins and Liebeskind (n 20).
134. Anderson, Linden and Habra (n 47); GJ Gold and B Weiner, ‘Remorse, Confession, Group Identity, and Expectancies’ (2000) 22 Basic Appl Soc Psychol 291.
135. Schlenker and Darby (n 119).
136. Fehr and Gelfand (n 18).
137. Mazor and others, ‘More than Words’ (n 126).
138. Slocum, Allan and Allan (n 17).
139. Anderson, Linden and Habra (n 47); Kirchhoff, Wagner and Strack (n 126).
140. Fehr and Gelfand (n 18).
141. Anderson, Linden and Habra (n 47); Scher and Darley (n 126); Schmitt and others (n 126).
142. Mazor and others, ‘More than Words’ (n 126).
143. Robbennolt, ‘Apologies and Legal Settlement’ (n 93); Robbennolt, ‘Apologies and Settlement Levers’ (n 93); Scher and Darley (n 126); Schmitt and others (n 126).
144. For exceptions to this preference, see Robbennolt, ‘Apologies and Legal Settlement’ (n 93); Robbennolt, ‘Apologies and Settlement Levers’ (n 93); Scher and Darley (n 126).
145. A Allan and others, ‘Apologies Following an Adverse Medical Event: The Importance of Focusing on the Consumer's Needs’ (2015) 98 Patient Edu Couns 1058; Robbennolt, ‘Apologies and Legal Settlement’ (n 93); Robbennolt, ‘Apologies and Settlement Levers’ (n 93).
146. Schmitt and others (n 126).
147. Schmitt and others (n 126); Slocum, Allan and Allan (n 17).
148. See, eg, Allan and others, ‘Apology in Restorative and Juvenile Justice’ (n 102); Allan, McKillop and Carroll (n 6); Allan and others, ‘Apologies Following an Adverse Medical Event’ (n 145); Mazor and others, ‘More than Words’ (n 126); Schmitt and others (n 126); Slocum, Allan and Allan (n 17).
149. S Bennet, ‘Gender and Apologies: Exploring Offended Females’ Perceptions of Apologies from Males and Females’ (Hon thesis, Edith Cowan University 2008).
150. Slocum, Allan and Allan (n 17).
151. Anderson, Linden and Habra (n 47); McCullough, Kurzban and Kurzban (n 76).
152. Ohbuchi, Kameda and Agarie (n 23).
153. Davis and Gold (n 95).
154. Schmitt and others (n 126). Research in the criminal field indicates that wrongdoers’ remorse may influence observers’ perception of their characters, but did not change the punishment they thought wrongdoers should receive. Police officers responded favourably to evidently guilty wrongdoers’ expressions of remorse, but mock jurors in criminal cases responded negatively when wrongdoers showed remorse at the time of the adverse event, especially in cases of relatively severe injuries. See Bornstein, Rung and Miller (n 37); DT Robinson, L Smith-Lovin and O Tsoudis, ‘Heinous Crime or Unfortunate Accident? The Effects of Remorse on Responses to Mock Criminal Confessions’ (1994) 73 Soc Forces 175; MV Day and M Ross, ‘The Value of Remorse: How Drivers’ Responses to Police Predict Fines for Speeding’ (2011) 35 Law Hum Behav 221.
155. MJ Cody and ML McLaughlin, ‘Accounts on Trial: Oral Arguments in Traffic Court’ in C Antaki (ed), Analysing Everyday Explanation: A Casebook of Methods (Sage, London 1988) 113–26; CL Kleinke, R Wallis and K Stalder, ‘Evaluation of a Rapist as a Function of Expressed Intent and Remorse’ (1992) 132 J Soc Psychol 525.
156. Weiner and others, ‘Public Confessions and Forgiveness’ (n 53); Zechmeister and others (n 90).
157. See, eg, Zechmeister and others (n 90).
158. Slocum, Allan and Allan (n 17).
159. JK Maner and others, ‘The Effects of Perspective Taking on Motivations for Helping: Still No Evidence for Altruism’ (2002) 28 Pers Soc Psychol Bull 1601; Zechmeister and Romero (n 29).
160. R Itoi, KL Ohbuchi and M Fukuno, ‘A Cross-cultural Study of Preference of Accounts: Relationship Closeness, Harm Severity, and Motives of Account Making’ (1996) 26 J Appl Soc Psychol 913.
161. JM Leunissen, ‘All Apologies: On the Willingness of Perpetrators to Apologize’ (DPhil thesis, Erasmus University Rotterdam 2014) 53–62.
162. This is especially likely after severe incidents: Ho (n 22).
163. See Allan and others, ‘Apologies Following an Adverse Medical Event’ (n 145); Iedema and others (n 101); Mazor and others, ‘More than Words’ (n 126); Robbennolt, ‘Effects of Negotiated and Delegated Apologies’ (n 93); DL Shapiro, ‘The Effects of Explanations on Negative Reactions to Deceit’ (1991) 36 Admin Sci Q 614; Shapiro, Buttner and Barry (n 54); Tversky and Kahneman, ‘Judgment Under Uncertainty’ (n 20).
164. See Anderson, Linden and Habra (n 47); Slocum, Allan and Allan (n 17).
165. S Hareli and Z Eisikovits, ‘The Role of Communicating Social Emotions Accompanying Apologies in Forgiveness’ (2006) 30 Motiv Emotion 189.
166. Weiner and others, ‘Public Confessions and Forgiveness’ (n 53).
167. Banerjee, Bennett and Luke (n 53).
168. Robbennolt, ‘Effects of Negotiated and Delegated Apologies’ (n 93).
169. Anderson, Linden and Habra (n 47); Fehr and Gelfand (n 18); Mazor and others, ‘More than Words’ (n 126); Schlenker and Darby (n 119); Shapiro, Buttner and Barry (n 54); Slocum, Allan and Allan (n 17).
170. See, eg, Allan and others, ‘Apology in Restorative and Juvenile Justice’ (n 102); AJ Howell and others, ‘The Disposition to Apologize’ (2011) 51 Pers Individ Dif 509.
171. RF Bataineh and RF Bataineh, ‘A Cross-cultural Comparison of Apology by Native Speakers of American English and Jordanian Arabic’ (2008) 40 J Pragmat 792.
172. MJ Gelfand and others, ‘Cultural Influences on Cultural Representations of Conflict: Interpretations of Conflict Episodes in the United States and Japan’ (2001) 86 J Appl Psychol 1059; N Sugimoto, Japanese Apology Across Disciplines (Nova Science Publishers, New York 1999).
173. Blum-Kulka and Olshtain (n 29); M Fukuno and K Ohbuchi, ‘How Effective are Different Accounts of Harm‐doing in Softening Victims’ Reactions? A Scenario Investigation of the Effects of Severity, Relationship, and Culture’ (1998) 1 Asian J Soc Psychol 167; X Guan, HS Park and HE Lee, ‘Cross-cultural Differences in Apology’ (2009) 33 Int J Intercult Relat 32; L Hickson, ‘The Social Contexts of Apology in Dispute Settlement: A Cross-cultural Study’ (1986) 25 Ethnology 283; Itoi, Ohbuchi and Fukuno (n 160); Ohtsubo (n 103); Takahashi (n 94); S Takaku, B Weiner and K Ohbuchi, ‘A Cross-cultural Examination of the Effect of Apology and Perspective Taking on Forgiveness’ (2001) 21 J Lang Soc Psychol 144; N Sugimuto, ‘A Japan-US Comparison of Apology Styles’ (1997) 24 Comm Res 349.
174. Gelfand and others (n 172).
175. Fehr and Gelfand (n 18).
176. See, eg, M Ashy, AE Mercurio and K Malley-Morrison, ‘Apology, Forgiveness, and Reconciliation: An Ecological World View Framework’ (2010) 8 Individ Dif Res 17; Banerjee, Bennett and Luke (n 53).
177. M Allemand, ‘Age Differences in Forgivingness: The Role of Future Time Perspective’ (2008) 42 J Res Pers 1137; P Ghaemmaghami, M Allemand and M Martin, ‘Forgiveness in Younger, Middle-aged and Older Adults: Age and Gender Matters’ (2011) 18 J Adult Dev 192; M Girard and E Mullet, ‘Forgiveness in Adolescents, Young, Middle-aged and Older Adults’ (1997) 4 J Adult Dev 209; Mazor (n 102); E Mullet and M Girard, ‘Developmental and Cognitive Points of View on Forgivingness’ in McCullough, Pargament and Thoresen (eds), Forgiveness (n 88) 111–32; E Mullet, M Girard and P Bakhshi, ‘Conceptualisations of Forgiveness’ (2004) 9 Eur Psychol 78; E Mullet and others, ‘“Forgivingness”: Factor Structure in a Sample of Young, Middle-aged, and Elderly Adults’ (1998) 3 Eur Psychol 289; SP Oliner, ‘Altruism, Forgiveness, Empathy, and Intergroup Apology’ (2005) 29 Humboldt J Soc Relat 8; M Steiner, M Allemand and ME McCullough, ‘Age Differences in Forgivingness: The Role of Transgression Frequency and Intensity’ (2011) 45 J Res Pers 670; LL Toussaint and others, ‘Forgiveness and Health: Age Differences in a U.S. Probability Sample’ (2001) 8 J Adult Dev 249.
178. For contrary findings, see Mazor and others, ‘Health Plan Members’ (n 80) and Idemudia and Mahri who found no significant age differences, and Allan and others, ‘Apologies Following an Adverse Medical Event’ (n 145) who found that younger people were more forgiving than older participants. Both Mazor (n 80) and Allan (n 145) looked at adverse medical events, which suggests that the general rule may not apply for medical events or that older people's higher expectations of health services influence their forgiveness in the medical context. See, eg, S Bostan, T Acuner and G Yilmaz, ‘Patient (Customer) Expectations in Hospitals’ (2007) 82 Health Policy 62; A Bowling, G Rowe and M McKee, ‘Patients’ Experiences of Their Healthcare in Relation to Their Expectations and Satisfaction: A Population Survey’ (2013) J R Soc Med 106, 143–49. ES Idemudia and S Mahri, ‘Can Gender, Religion, Education, Age and Personality Predict Willingness to Forgive?’ (2011) 9 Gender Behav 3765.
179. Mazor and others, ‘Health Plan Members’(n 80) and Idemudia and Mahri (n 178) found higher-educated people have a greater tendency to forgive, but Mullet and Girard (n 177) found no difference.
180. Mazor and her colleagues found men more likely to forgive than women, but Toussaint and Webb failed to find such difference: Mazor and others, ‘Health Plan Members’ (n 80); LL Toussaint and JR Webb, ‘Gender Differences in the Relationship Between Empathy and Forgiveness’ (2005) 145 J Soc Psychol 673.
181. MH Gonzales, DJ Manning and LA Haugen, ‘Explaining Our Sins: Factors Influencing Offender Accounts and Anticipated Victim Responses’ (1992) 62 J Pers Soc Psychol 958; MH Gonzales and others, ‘Pardon My Gaffe: Effects of Sex, Status, and Consequence Severity on Accounts’ (1990) 58 J Pers Soc Psychol 610; Hodgins and Liebeskind (n 20); HS Hodgins, E Liebeskind and W Schwartz, ‘Getting Out of Hot Water: Facework in Social Predicaments’ (1996) 71 J Pers Soc Psychol 300.
182. K Schumann and M Ross, ‘Why Women Apologise More than Men: Gender Differences in Thresholds for Perceiving Offensive Behaviour’ (2010) 21 Psychol Sci 1649.
183. RF Bataineh and RF Bataineh, ‘American University Students’ Apology Strategies: An Intercultural Analysis of the Effect of Gender’ (2005) 9 J Intercult Commun 1.
184. See, eg, Ashy, Mercurio and Malley-Morrison (n 176); Boon and Sulsky (n 120); Hodgins and Liebeskind (n 20).
185. MH Gonzales, LA Haugen and DJ Manning, ‘“Victims as Narrative Critics”, Factors Influencing Rejoinders and Evaluative Responses to Offenders’ Accounts’ (1994) 20 Pers Soc Psychol Bull 691.
186. Bennet (n 149).
187. JL Sulzer and RK Burglass, ‘Responsibility Attribution, Empathy, and Punitiveness’ (1968) 36 J Pers 272.
188. Ashy, Mercurio and Malley-Morrison (n 176); JW Berry and others, ‘Forgivingness, Vengeful Rumination, and Affective Traits’ (2005) 73 J Pers 183; LA Brose and others, ‘Forgiveness and Personality Traits’ (2005) 39 Pers Individ Dif 35; Idemudia and Mahri (n 178); J Maltby, L Day and L Barber, ‘Forgiveness and Mental Health Variables: Interpreting the Relationship Using an Adaptational-Continuum Model of Personality and Coping’ (2004) 37 Pers Individ Dif 1629; J Maltby and others, ‘Personality Predictors of Levels of Forgiveness Two and a Half Years after the Transgression’ (2008) 42 J Res Pers 1088; ME McCullough and WT Hoyt, ‘Transgression-related Motivational Dispositions: Personality Substrates of Forgiveness and their Links to the Big Five’ (2002) 28 Pers Soc Psychol Bull 1556; Schmitt and others (n 126).
189. Allan and others, ‘Apology in Restorative and Juvenile Justice’ (n 102); Takaku (n 22); Takaku, Weiner and Ohbuchi (n 173).
190. Risen and Gilovich (n 38).
191. J Eaton and others, ‘When Apologies Fail: The Moderating Effect of Implicit and Explicit Self-esteem on Apology and Forgiveness’ (2007) 6 Self and Identity 209.
192. Thomas and Millar (n 31).
193. JA Dixon and others, ‘The Role of Speech Accommodation and Crime Type in Attribution of Guilt’ (1994) 134 J Soc Psychol 465; FD Fincham and M Hewstone, ‘Social Categorization and Personal Similarity as Determinants of Attribution Bias: A Test of Defensive Attribution’ (1982) 21 Brit J Soc Psychol 51.
194. See, eg, Gonzales and others (n 181); RO Salvador, R Folger and M Priesemuth, ‘Organizational Apology and Defense: Effects of Guilt and Managerial Status’ (2012) 24 J Managerial Issues 124.
195. GF Bachman and LK Guerrero, ‘Relational Quality and Communicative Responses Following Hurtful Events in Dating Relationships: An Expectancy Violations Analysis’ (2006b) 23 J Soc Pers Relat 943; JM Darley and TS Pittman, ‘The Psychology of Compensatory and Retributive Justice’ (2003) 7 Pers Soc Psychol Rev 324; Gonzales, Haugen and Manning (n 185); Schroeder and Linder (n 59); Weiner and others, ‘An Attributional Analysis of Excuse Giving’ (n 53).
196. Bennett and Earwaker (n 133); CW Struthers and others, ‘The Effects of Attributions of Intent and Apology on Forgiveness: When Saying Sorry May Not Help the Story’ (2008) 44 J Exp Soc Psychol 983.
197. Boon and Sulsky (n 120); JM Leunissen and others, ‘The Apology Mismatch: Asymmetries Between Victim's Need for Apologies and Perpetrator's Willingness to Apologize’ (2013) 49 J Exp Soc Psychol 315.
198. GD Reeder and others, ‘Inferences About the Morality of an Aggressor: The Role of Perceived Motive’ (2002) 83 J Pers Soc Psychol 789; GD Reeder and JM Spores, ‘The Attribution of Morality’ (1983) 44 J Pers Soc Psychol 736.
199. Struthers and others (n 196).
200. Relationships can vary in respect of their nature, ranging from incidental (eg, two motorists who collide) to established (romantic or business relationships) and their purpose, ranging from instrumental (professional-client) to intrinsic (friendship) relationships. The social distance between parties at the time of the event can range from being strangers (eg, where there was an accident) to very close, such as in romantic and professional relationships. The direction of relationships can range from horizontal (eg, between romantic or business partners) to vertical (eg, between superiors and subordinates or professionals and clients). In the case of vertical relationships, the roles of the parties will dictate their status which could range from low to high. The norms of relationships also differ because all established relationships, whether interpersonal, group or organisational, have norms based on explicit agreements or, more frequently, implicit and informal understandings amongst members of the relevant group. Group members may not always be able to articulate the rules, but know when they have been violated. Finally, but very importantly, the level of trust in relationships may differ. At the social end of the continuum, people trust those who cross their paths to adhere to generally accepted norms (ie, moral and legal rules) and to be competent (ie, have the knowledge and skills required) to undertake the activities they engage in, such as driving a motor car. At the other end of the continuum are fiduciary relationships where people, by definition, have to place high trust in those they have the relationships with. People often engage in these relationships to satisfy their basic human needs, but by necessity make themselves vulnerable to exploitation by those they have to trust. People in relationships may have to trust others because of their circumstances (eg, people whose cognitive, communication and physical disabilities make them reliant on others to survive), because their psychological needs to belong and to feel loved motivates them to enter into intimate relationships or because their survival needs lead to them to gain employment or to enter into professional relationships. Baumeister and Leary (n 75); A Allan and MM Allan, ‘The Definition and Nature of Domestic Violence’ in MF Taylor, JA Pooley and RS Taylor (eds), Overcoming Domestic Violence: Creating a Dialogue Round Vulnerable Populations (Nova Science Publishers 2014) 11; VL Hamilton, ‘Who Is Responsible? Toward a Social Psychology or Responsibility Attribution’ (1978) 41 Soc Psychol 316; SL Robinson, ‘Trust and Breach of the Psychological Contract’ (1996) 41 Admin Sci Q 574; DM Rousseau, Psychological Contracts in Organizations: Understanding Written and Unwritten Agreements (Sage Publications 1995).
201. J Eaton and CW Struthers, ‘The Reduction of Psychological Aggression Across Varied Interpersonal Contexts Through Repentance and Forgiveness’ (2006) 32 Aggress Behav 195.
202. McCullough and others (n 77); McCullough, Worthington and Rachal (n 95).
203. Slocum, Allan and Allan (n 17).
204. See Robinson (n 200).
205. M Daly, C Salmon and M Wilson, ‘Kinship: The Conceptual Hole in Psychological Studies of Social Cognition and Close Relationships’ in JA Simpson and DT Kenrick (eds), Evolutionary Social Psychology (Lawrence Erlbaum, New Jersey 1997).
206. Eaton and Struthers (n 201).
207. RH Fazio, SJ Sherman and PM Herr, ‘The Feature-positive Effect in the Self-perception Process: Does Not Doing Matter as Much as Doing?’ (1982) 42 J Pers Soc Psychol 404.
208. JM Darley, ‘Citizens’ Sense of Justice and the Legal System’ in JB Ruscher and EY Hammer (eds), Current Directions in Social Psychology (Pearson, New Jersey 2004) 178–83.
209. This may, however, not necessarily be the case in all contexts, as Mazor and her colleagues’ participants indicated they were least likely to forgive medical doctors suspected of incompetence, inattention, or a lack of caring: Mazor and others, ‘Health Plan Members’ (n 80).
210. PH Kim and others, ‘When More Blame is Better than Less: The Implications of Internal vs. External Attributions for the Repair of Trust after a Competence- vs. Integrity-based Trust Violation (2006) 99 Organ Behav Hum Decis Process 49.
211. Cody and McLaughlin, ‘Interpersonal Accounting’ (n 23).
212. For a review of the debate regarding the relative value of apologies depending on whether the consequences are tangible or intangible, see Allan (n 2); Shuman (n 3).
213. See L Berkowitz and E Harmon-Jones, ‘Toward an Understanding of the Determinants of Anger’ (2004) 4 Emotion 107.
214. Allan, McKillop and Caroll (n 6).
215. Bennett and Earwaker (n 133); Hodgins and Liebeskind (n 20); Itoi, Ohbuchi and Fukuno (n 160); Kirchhoff, Wagner and Strack (n 126); Robbennolt, ‘Apologies and Legal Settlement’ (n 93); Zechmeister and others (n 90).
216. Blumstein and others, ‘The Honoring of Accounts’ (1974) 39 Am Sociol Rev 551; Shapiro, Buttner and Barry (n 54).
217. Witman, Park and Hardin (n 30).
218. Anderson, Linden and Habra (n 47); Bennett and Earwaker (n 133); Blumstein and others (n 216); Boon and Sulsky (n 120); Ohbuchi, Kameda and Agari (n 23); Ohbuchi and Sato (n 22); Robbennolt, ‘Apologies and Legal Settlement’ (n 93); Shapiro (n 163); E Walster, ‘Assignment of Responsibility for an Accident’ (1966) 3 J Pers Soc Psychol 13; Schlenker and Darby (n 119).
The authors wish to thank Maria Allan, Margaret Halsmith, Julie Macfarlane and James Strickland for their insightful comments on an earlier version of this paper and Joanna Lilly, Jessica Panegyres, Natascha Sommer, David Preece Beron Tan and Yannis Vrodos for their research assistance.